ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
For the purpose of devising reasoning techniques under uncertainty, people in artificial intelligence (Gordon and Shortliffe [1] ) pay attention to the theory of evidence (Sharer [2] ). Ishizuka et al. [3] applied this theory to the management of uncertainty in expert systems.
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The unicity of Dempster's rule (Dempster [4] ) for combining uncertain items of information issued from independent sources was proved by Dubois and Prade [5] . They also proposed weak and strong conditioning rules that are the generalization of conditioning [5] . Motivated by their work, this paper proposes three conditioning rules with normalization. Our rules are different from theirs in the way in which normalization is achieved.
Shafer [6] explained how Jeffrey's rule of conditioning can be understood in terms of belief functions (Shafer [2] ). But Shafer's argument is based on the retrospective and constructive point of view, It is not a direct generalization of Jeffrey's rule. When the prior beliefs are additive and the new evidence bears only on a partition El, E2, "'', En of the frame [2, then the new degrees of belief P(Ei) obtained by Dempster's rule are different from those obtained by Jeffrey's rule. Neither the weak conditioning nor the strong conditioning rule of Dubois and Prade yields Jeffrey's rule as a special case. In our newly proposed rules of conditioning, Jeffrey's rule is a direct consequence of a special case. Our main concern is the normalization in the rule of conditioning.
BAYES' THEOREMS AND A GENERALIZATION BY JEFFREY
Let 0 = {01, 02, "" ", 0~ } be a set of disjoint states of nature such as disease, and let X = {Xl, x2, "", xt} be a set of disjoint items of information such as information about symptoms. If the disease is Oi, then the symptom is xj with a probability p(xjlO~). When a prior Bayesian belief function p(Oi):O "-* [0, 1] , which is to say, a prior probability function, is given, then a posterior Bayesian belief function assigns any particular 0 the degree of belief
Formula (2.1) is often called the Bayes theorem. Bayesian rules of inference for diagnosis are written for all i E {1, "-', k} andj E {1, .-., 1} as follows.
• If the symptom is xj, then the diagnosis is Oi with posterior probability (2.4) for the partition Ej of f] where p' represents new evidence that bears directly only on the partition Et, E2, "" ", En. The new probability of a set E; is equal to the probability of Ej representing new evidence.
THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY OF EVIDENCE
Shafer's belief function (Shafer [2] ) was originally called a lower probability by Dempsmr. A lower probability (I~mpster [4] ) is a mapping P, from 2 n to [0, 1] . A lower probability is uniquely defined through the specification of basic probability assignment satisfying 
B~A--/=O
Suppose Pl is the basic probability assignment for a lower probability P1, over a frame fl, and denote the focal elements of Pt, by At, "" ", Ak. Also, the basic probability assignment of a second lower probability P2, is P2, and its focal elements are BI, "", Bt.
In order to carry out the combination of Pt. and P2,, a probability mass of measure PI(Ai) p2(Bj) is committed to the intersection of two sets Ai and Bj.
The total probability mass exactly committed to a given subset A of fl will have measure
~0" Pt(Ai)p2(BJ)
Aif'IBj=A
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The difficulty with this scheme is that it may happen that ~# pl(Ai)P2(By)>O (3.4) ,4inaj=~b
A new basic probability assignment P0 for the lower probability of P=, and P2, is defined by Dempster as
Let PI, be a prior belief function, and let P2, represent new evidence. Let fl be the Cartesian product O × X. Whenpl is a regular probability assignment on 0 x Xandp: focuses on a single focal element {xj} x e, then (3.5) is Bayes' rule of (2.1). Thus,
When P2 is also a regular probability assignment on X that is a coarsening of O × X (P2 focuses on a partition of X), by (3.5) we have
Replacing Pz({xj} x O) and Pl ({xi} x {0j}) by p'(xj) and P(Xjl 0~) p(Oi),
{Xm} x on {xj} x {oi} =¢ (3.8) (3.9) 148 Hidetomo Ichihashi and Hideo Tanaka
Hence the function P3 of Definition 1 is a basic probability assignment. The lower probability given by P3 is denoted Pl, * P2,. This rule of conditioning is no longer commutative, i.e., Pt, $ P2, * P2, * Pt,. This property is not shared by Dempster's rule. The weak conditioning rule in Dubois and Prade [5] is symmetric in the mass function being combined and so is not equivalent to our asymmetric rule in Definition 1. We can call (4.7) the rule of conditioning by the upper probability P*. This property is shared by Dempster's rule. 
P3,(A)=PI,(A U [~)
and (4.16)
P*(A)=P*(A (~ B)
• (4.17) • This is the extreme case where the partition E~, E2, "" ", E~ is as fine as fl itself (i.e., each Ei is a single point). This property is shared by the additive probability distribution in applying Jeffrey's rule of conditioning (see Shafer [6] , p. 4). 
DEFINITION 2 Assuming that P I, and P2, are two iower probabilities as in Definition 1, the function p,:2 a -~ [0, 1] is defined as

Am~Bj
It is easy to prove that the function P4 is a basic probability assignment. Let us now consider the rule of conditioning by P4 in Definition 2. 
Thus P4,(A) = PI,(A) and P~(A) = P*(A).
When Pl and P2 are the regular probability assignments for P1, and P2,, and P2, is combinable with Pi,, then we can readily see that Pi, • P2, = P2,-As in ( 
P*(A, B)
Ps,(A) = 1 -PT(A) = 1
P*(B) P*(A U B)-P*(A)
-PI * (19)
PI,(A)-PI,(A N 19)
• (4.42)
-P1, (19)
It should be noted that P~(A, B) ~ P~(A N B).
We have proposed three conditioning rules. When the focal subsets of Pt* are singletons and P2, focuses only on the partition El, E2, "" ", E,, Jeffrey's rule of conditioning discussed in Section 2 is recovered in each case. The denominators of the conditioning rules represent measures of the extent of the conflict. Since Pl. and P2, do not commit probability to disjoint (or contradictory) subsets Ai and Bj, the denominator of (4.2) in Definition 1 measures the extent of conflict in the sense that A~ N By = ~, and that of (4.27) in Definition 2 measures the extent of the conflict in the sense that A~ ~ Bj. That of (4.35) is the same as Definition 1, but Pl, and P2. commit a probability to Ai, if it is not contradictory to Bj. Hence we call the three conditioning rules plausible, credible, and possible conditioning, respectively. We can choose one of the three rules depending on the situation.
The drawback to the proposed rules of conditioning in Definitions 1-3 is that the condition of combinability is very restrictive. To relax the condition of combinability, we propose the following renormalizations. where it is assumed that the denominator of each function is not equal to zero.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have proposed three rules of conditioning that are direct generalizations of Jeffrey's rule of conditioning. There might be situations in which we want to treat evidence asymmetrically, and in such cases our rules can provide a convenient generalization of Jeffrey's rule.
Our conditioning rules will be applied to decision problems treating the value of information sources in the framework of the theory of evidence.
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